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signals the judicial recognition in Florida of a valuable scientific de-
vice which will aid in identifying the guilty while protecting the
innocent.32
Constitutional Law - STATE TAXATION-AIRPORT USE TAXES IMPOSED
ON DEPARTING COMMERCIAL AIRLINE PASSENGERS ONLY AS COMPEN-
SATION FOR USE OF FACILITIES VIOLATE No FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS.-Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
The rapid increase in private and commercial aviation operations'
has necessitated concomitant airport development and expansion. One
method of generating funds for these purposes is the so-called air-
port use tax. Prior to 1972, only Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey and an Indiana airport authority district had actually imposed
such taxes. 2 With slight variations, the tax in each instance took the
printed. In such a situation the voiceprint could be excluded as the "fruit" of a con-
stitutionally impermissible seizure. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
One possible result of Dionisio on the practice of voiceprinting may be that prosecu-
tors will resort to grand jury process to compel the voiceprinting of a suspect in situa-
tions where there is no probable cause to arrest the suspect. Thus a prosecutor could
obtain a desired voiceprint without running the risk of having the results excluded.
See United States v. Mara, 93 S. Ct. 781, 789 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting in Dionisio
and Mara).
31. No statutory violations were at issue in the principal case. But in the case
of a surreptitious voiceprinting, obtained without the consent of the parties involved,
FLA. STAT. § 934.01(4) (1971) may be relevant. It provides in part: "To safeguard the
privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral communications when none
of the parties to the communication has consented to the interception should be allowed
only when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction .... ".See generally Alea
v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
32. In his concurring opinion, Judge Mager elaborated on the social policies favor-
ing the admission of voiceprints as direct evidence: "Protecting society from those who
have violated the law as well as protecting the one who has been unjustly accused
serves to heighten the need for more sophisticated methods of crime prevention and
crime detection." 263 So. 2d at 616.
1. An "operation" is defined as either a take-off or a landing. Commercial opera-
tions at airports with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) control towers increased
by approximately 33%, from 7,819,114 in 1965 to 10,393,294 in 1970. See At TRANSPORT
Ass'N OF AMERICA, ANNUAL REPORT OF U.S. ScnEDULED AIRLINE INDUSTRY 21 (1971). In
1965, there were 26,572,650 general aviation operations and in 1970, 41,384,006-an increase
of approximately 55%. See id.
2. Several other localities-for example, Los Angeles, California; Raleigh-Durham,
North Carolina; Spokane County, Washington; and Hawaii-had proposed but had
declined to adopt similar taxes. Four of the proposed taxes were rejected after legal
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form of a one-dollar levy imposed on each passenger departing aboard
a commercial air carrier. Passengers on private planes, nonpassengers
and various other classes of users were exempt. Several of the com-
mercial carriers challenged the constitutionality of these taxes in the
respective state courts. The Indiana, Montana and New Jersey taxes
were struck down; New Hampshire's tax was sustained.3 In Evans-
ville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,'
the Supreme Court consolidated the Indiana and New Hampshire
cases and upheld the constitutionality of these taxes against the claims
that they impermissibly infringed the right to travel, imposed an
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce and denied some air
travelers equal protection of law.
In upholding the constitutionality of the taxes, the Court dis-
missed, in almost summary fashion, the attack based on the right to
travel.5 In rejecting the challenges based on the commerce and equal
protection clauses, the Court characterized the taxes as "not wholly
opinions were rendered declaring that such taxes would unconstitutionally burden the
right to travel. See Note, Airport "Service Charges" and the Constitutional Barriers to
State Taxations of Airport Users, 43 U. CoLo. L. Rxv. 79 (1971).
3. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 265
N.E.2d 27 (Ind. 1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 707 (1972); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Joint City-
County Airport Bd., 463 P.2d 470 (Mont. 1970); Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. New
Hampshire Aeronautics Comm'n, 273 A.2d 676 (N.H. 1971), aff'd sub nor. Evans-
ville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972);
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Sills, 264 A.2d 268 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1970).
4. 405 U.S. 707 (1972). Mr. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion. Mr.
Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the case; Mr. Justice
Douglas dissented.
5. The argument that the taxes violated the taxpayers' right to travel, as estab-
lished in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), had prevailed in two of
the state courts. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Joint City-County Airport Bd., 463 P.2d
470 (Mont. 1970); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Sills, 264 A.2d 268 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1970).
In Crandall the Court struck down a Nevada capitation tax levied upon the privilege
of leaving the state aboard common carriers. Subsequent decisions have effectively
qualified and distinguished Crandall's broad proscription by upholding state use taxes
which compel the interstate traveler to pay fair compensation for the cost of the
state facilities he uses. See Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950);
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176 (1940); Hendrick v. Maryland,
235 U.S. 610 (1915). The Court easily distinguished the tax in Evansville from the
Nevada privilege tax since the latter was not a use tax levied as compensation for
facilities used by the traveler. 405 U.S. at 712.
The Court found no room for application of the compelling state interest test of
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), or Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969),
which Mr. Justice Douglas argued in dissent was triggered by any classification penalizing
exercise of the right to travel. 405 U.S. at 724 n.3 (dissenting opinion). The Court stated:
The facility provided at public expense aids rather than hinders the right
to travel. A permissible charge to help defray the cost of the facility is there-
fore not a burden in the constitutional sense.
Id. at 714.
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unreasonable" and as a "fair approximation" and "rational measure"
of the commercial passengers' use of airport facilities. The levies, the
Court concluded, thus lay within the area of permissible state dis-
cretion.
Evansville is the first constitutional challenge to a state tax imposed
as compensation for the use of facilities to be heard by the Court since
Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice.6 The decision is significant in the
range of freedom it leaves the states in devising and imposing con-
stitutionally valid use taxes.7 Here, as in Ferguson v. Skrupas in the
area of substantive economic due process,9 the Court seems to have
exhumed for brief examination and then to have reinterred the
notion that the judiciary has any very substantial role to play as
arbiter of the propriety of state use taxation. The case suggests that
for all practical purposes that function will be left to the legislatures
of the states.
The single most striking feature of the taxing schemes involved
in Evansville was that users who were not taxed outnumbered those
who were. The Court was candid in its acknowledgement of this
fact:
We recognize that in imposing a fee on the boarding of com-
mercial flights, both the Indiana and New Hampshire measures ex-
empt in whole or part a majority of the actual number of persons
who use facilities of the airports involved.1°
Such a scheme, the carriers argued, could not meet the standard of
National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue,"' under which the
6. 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
7. Within five months after the Court's decision in Evansvwille, seventeen other
airports had already imposed or were about to impose such taxes. See AVIATION WEEK
AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Aug. 14, 1972, at 23.
8. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
9. See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court, in
1962 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 34 (P. Kurland ed.).
10. 405 U.S. at 717-18. At the Evansville Airport, for example, there were, in
1967, 84,598 take-offs and landings by exempt aircraft but only 14,834 such operations
by commercial, nonexempt carriers. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 265 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. 1970). Again in 1967, slightly less than
147,000 commercial passengers enplaned at Evansville, while approximately 85,000
private flights were recorded. Id. These figures are not atypical. FAA statistics show
that in 1971 private aircraft operations accounted for 75% of all operations at FAA
facilities in the United States. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FAA AnR TRAFFIC
ACTIVrTY 4 (1971).
11. 386 U.S. 753 (1967). Bellas Hess involved a tax imposed by Illinois on a Missouri
mail order house. The company collected the tax from its Illinois customers for its "use"
of the state's legal protection and economic markets in conducting its business.
(Vol. I
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validity of a state tax on interstate commerce was said to turn on the
extent to which it compelled such commerce to shoulder a "fair share"
of the cost of using local privileges. 12 Nor could these taxes be squared
with the long-established standard first imposed in Hendrick v. Mary-
land" that fees collected as compensation for use of state facilities be
levied according to a "uniform, fair, and practical standard.' 1 4 Finally
it was urged that under McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines's the
taxes must bear some reasonable relation to the taxpayers' use of state
facilities, and that these did not.'6
The claimed failure of the present taxes to meet these standards
was implicitly focused by the Indiana Supreme Court in its opinion
striking down the Evansville tax:
[P]ersons who may make very extensive use of the facilities are not
subject to the tax unless they actually board one of the appellees'
flights. For example, a commercial passenger carrying only a brief-
case may be driven to the airport by his wife, immediately buy a
ticket and board the airplane. He is subject to the so-called "use"
tax. Another person may drive to the airport and park his car at
the facility provided, get a haircut, eat dinner, use the washroom,
and then get in his own private jet and take off. He does not pay
the $1 tax.17
The Court rejoined that "passengers as a class may be distinguished
from other airport users, if only because the boarding of flights re-
quires the use of runways and navigational facilities not occasioned by
nonflight activities."' 8 The taxes also reflected "rational distinctions
among different classes of passengers and aircraft" because "[c]ommer-
12. Brief for Respondents, at 27, Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist.
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
13. 235 U.S. 610 (1915). Hendrick sustained a state automobile registration tax based
on the horsepower of the vehicle, the Court defining the area of state discretion in com-
puting the tax by holding, first, that when a state furnishes special facilities utilized in
commerce, it may exact compensation from the users and, secondly, that the amount and
method of collection are "primarily for determination by the State," provided only that
the charge be reasonable and computed according to a "uniform, fair and practical stand-
ard." Id. at 624.
14. Brief for Respondents, supra note 12, at 27.
15. 309 U.S. 176 (1940). McCarroll struck down an Arkansas highway tax imposed
on the amount of gasoline in excess of twenty gallons in a vehicle's fuel tank when it
entered the state. Because the amount of gasoline in the tanks bore no reasonable rela-
tion to the amount of travel, hence use, within the state and because a "fair charge"
for use "could not even be roughly computed" by reference to the gasoline carried, the
levy was invalidated. Id. at 180.
16. Brief for Respondents, supra note 12, at 27-28.
17. 265 N.E.2d at 30.
18. 405 U.S. at 718.
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cial air traffic requires more elaborate navigation and terminal facilities,
as well as longer and more costly runway systems, than do flights by
smaller private planes."',, These factors, according to the Court, meant
that the taxes reflected a "fair if imperfect approximation of the use
of facilities for whose benefit they are imposed ' ' 20 and thus made the
present case consistent with the standards of Capitol Greyhound Lines
v. Brice: 2
[I]t is the amount of the tax, not its formula, that is of central con-
cern. At least so long as the toll is based on some fair approximation
of use or privilege for use, as was that before us in Capitol Grey-
hound, and is neither discriminatory against interstate commerce
nor excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit con-
ferred, it will pass constitutional muster, even though some other
formula might reflect more exactly the relative use of the state
facilities by individual users. 22
Reference to Capitol Greyhound only serves to underscore the large
discretion which Evansville has left the states in imposing use taxes.
That case involved a challenge to a flat two percent toll on the fair
market value of motor vehicles used in interstate commerce; the tax
was thus virtually unrelated to use. The Court stressed that the tax
"should be judged by its result, not its formula. ' 23 If not excessive,
the tax should be sustained.2 4 The variety of factors capable of
affecting use were "so countless that we must be content with 'rough
approximation rather than precision."' 2 5 But the flat tax in Capitol
Greyhound was also coupled with a mileage tax, so that the actual
19. Id. Moreover, the parties stipulated in the case of the Evansville tax
that "[m]ost of the facilities constituting the Terminal Building at Dress Memorial
Airport would not be essential for the operation of a noncommercial airport
except for the required use thereof by persons traveling on commercial airline
[sic]," that "runway lengths, approach areas, taxiways, and ramp areas of said
Dress Memorial Airport would not be so extensive except for the requirement that
the same be sufficiently extensive in order to accommodate commercial airline
carriers and their passengers," and that "Dress Memorial Airport operates and
maintains an instrument lighting system and an approach lighting system for use
by commercial airlines, both of which are costly to maintain and operate and
would not be necessary in connection with use by private, noncommercial air-
craft."
Id. at 718 n.12.
20. Id. at 717.
21. 339 U.S. at 547.
22. 405 U.S. at 716-17.
23. 339 U.S. at 545.
24. Id.




amount paid did reflect actual use2---something obviously not true
in Evansville, where substantial users paid no tax at all. The "rough"
approximations referred to in Capitol Greyhound and applied in
Evansville would seem to be rough indeed.2 7
Evansville thus stands as an indication-or perhaps a reaffirmation-
of an important judicial attitude. State use taxation, like substantive
economic due process, is an area in which state legislatures are virtually
free to go their own way. The Court's cursory disposition of the equal
protection argument emphasizes this fact.28 It is possible, of course, if
26. 339 U.S. at 546.
27. The Court simply avoided the "fair share" language of Bellas Hess, possibly re-
garding that decision as irrelevant since it involved an entirely different type of use taxa-
tion. The use in Bellas Hess, being a "use" of a state's legal protection and economic
markets, did not constitute a highly tangible, direct and physical utilization of state
facilities as is present in the use of highways and runways, for example.
28. The taxes were attacked on the ground that exemption of private users denies
commercial passengers equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment.
In response to such challenges the Court has evolved a deferential and now in-
stitutionalized "rational basis" approach to the constitutionality of state tax classifica-
tions under the equal protection clause. Probably the most quoted language in this
evolution appears in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920), where the
equal protection clause was interpreted to require that "all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike." Id. at 415.
Although it appears in Evansville that both private and commercial passengers were
similarly circumstanced by virtue of their comparable use of the airport facilities, the
Court dispensed with the equal protection issue in a footnote. 405 U.S. at 719 n.13.
In that note the Court seemed to apply the same rationale it employed to reject the
commerce clause argument, finding that the classification scheme reflected a "rational
measure of relative use." Id. As in its treatment of the commerce clause challenge, the
Court relied upon the "but for" approach in discerning a rational distinction between
classes of passengers-namely, that commercial use alone necessitated longer runways,
more elaborate navigational equipment and so forth. But the Court has said that in
order to establish a rational basis for treating classes of persons differently, "the
classification must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation"-here the defrayal of all the airport's operating
costs, not just the cost of the longer runways and other expanded facilities necessitated
by commercial use. See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist., Ind., Ordinance
No. 33, Feb. 26, 1968.
The tenuous character of the relation between exemption of private users and the
defrayal of the cost of airport facilities is accentuated by other charges which help
finance airport construction and are borne by the commercial user only. First, com-
mercial passengers already pay for those areas which commercial carriers use through
a collateral fee. For example, Delta Airlines argued that, in addition to having their
passengers pay the one-dollar Evansville use tax, the airlines are required to pay
$4.31 per square foot per annum ($4,749.62 total yearly) for ticket counter and back
office space, plus eight to ten cents per 1,000 pounds per month in the form of landing
fees, plus various other collateral fees. Brief for Respondents, supra note 12, at 55-57. Sec-
ondly, differential use of runways and elaborate navigational systems is at least partially
offset by the fact that commercial carriers pay for the use of runways through a graduated
landing fee based upon the weight of the aircraft. Heavier commercial aircraft thus
pay a proportionately greater fee for their use of the extended runway length. See
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somewhat unlikely, that a tax so unrelated to use could be devised as
to be "wholly unreasonable." But after Evansville, the point at which
this could occur is apparently only slightly short of the bounds of the
taxing authority's imagination.
Constitutional Law - STATE CONSTITUTIONS-CITY OF MIAMI BEACH
LACKS POWER UNDER HOME RULE PROVISIONS OF 1968 FLORIDA CONSTI-
TUTION To ENACT RENT CONTROL ORDINANCE. City of Miami Beach
v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
In 1969 the city council of Miami Beach determined that an
emergency situation had been created in the city by a shortage of low-
cost housing, a large proportion of retired citizens living on pensions
and an inflationary price spiral. For the purpose of protecting its
residents from exorbitant rents, the city council enacted a rent con-
trol ordinance providing for the regulation of rents for housing with
four or more rental units.' A city rent agency consisting of an advisory
committee and an administrator was created to administer the controls.
Several affected lessors brought an action against the city, seeking
injunctive relief and a judgment declaring the ordinance void for
violating article VIII, section 2, of the 1968 Florida constitution. The
Circuit Court for Dade County granted summary judgment for the
plaintiffs.2 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
city of Miami Beach did not have the power to enact a rent control
ordinance, that the ordinance was an unlawful delegation of legisla-
tive authority to the city rent agency and that the ordinance conflicted
with state law.3
generally Levine, Landing Fees and the Airport Congestion Problems, 12 J. LAw & ECON.
79 (1969). Thirdly, commercial passengers pay a federal excise tax of 8% of the
price of their airline ticket, which amount is used by the federal government in
financing airport construction and maintenance. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4261-63.
1. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 1791, Oct. 1969. As quoted in the Fleetwood
opinion, the ordinance exempted from control "hospitals, nursing homes, retirement
homes, asylums or public institutions, college or school dormitories or any charitable
or educational or non-profit institutions, hotels, motels, public housing, condominiums
and cooperative apartments, and any housing accommodations completed after December
1, 1969." 261 So. 2d at 802.
2. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 33 Fla. Supp, 192 (Dade County
Cir. Ct. 1970).
3. Emphasis in this comment is placed on the court's interpretation of the
constitutional provision for municipal home rule. As an additional ground for its
holding the court stated that the ordinance failed to provide objective guidelines and
standards for its enforcement by the city rent agency and thus was an unlawful dele-
gation of power to the agency. Though maximum rents were specified by the ordinance
[Vol. I
